SRJC- English 5 Marco Giordano, inst.



QUESTIONS ON THE MENO



7OAl-4 In light of the background of Meno and what he knows of Socrates, (79e7-80 a 3) and the conditions of his presence in Athens (76e) consider the abruptness of the opening of the dialogue. Is it ironic? Does it reflect on Meno's character?

70 a5-7lb8 Consider Socrates' speech. It doesn't answer the question. Consider the purpose of the contrast between Thessaly (known to be an unruly country from references in the Crito and an ally of the Persians (enemies of Greece)) and the Athenians--who would not claim to know what virtue is (on the other hand note 92e--93). What assumption in Meno's question is addressed by this maneuver? Consider also the last question. Is the kind of knowing mentioned there like the kind of knowing appropriate to human excellence?

7lb9-c7 How genuine is Meno's surprise? What assumptions do you think Meno wants to be understood by it on the part of his audience in both cases? Note how Socrates' answer provokes the revelation of assumptions in Meno's next question. Which one is he most interested in? Reconsider the intention of Socrates' opening speech in this light.

7lc8-d3 Consider the irony of this assertion in relation to 85d2-e2 and 71bl-bS. Note the distinction between knowing something and knowing what another person says about it.

7ld4-d9 Consider all the implications of this speech in relation to the questions you have already asked. Does it seem that some part of the dialogue has concluded itself here? If so, what would you entitle that part? What is its purpose? What essentially did it accomplish for the rest of the dialogue? How does it caution Meno's next speech? How does Meno react to this condition? Note how many times Meno asserts the easiness of the task. Recall again the abruptness of the opening question and perhaps Meno's behavior at 75 bl and 76a9-c3 or Socrates' comment at 73c7-9 & 74b3. Be prepared to compare and contrast Meno's efforts to "recollect," his difficulties with inquiring into knowledge with his own slave's. Consider also Meno's argument at 8Od6-dll. Is your reception of that argument changed by your perception of the person who makes it? What is your perception of the character of Meno?

71el-73c5 constitutes another unit. Separate it into its parts noting where it begins and ends and what each part does in relation to the others. Think about and record questions about the appropriateness of the arguments and the kinds of knowledge of kinds of evidence they demand.

At 73 c 6 Socrates is ready to address the question where it was left at 71 d, challenging Meno to make an effort to recall, under the assumption that some sort of common excellence underlies all excellent qualities, what Gorgias said on the matter of human excellence. Meno's answer, "leadership ability," is subverted immediately by applying it to the example of slaves for whom Socrates ironically notes Meno would not find leadership ability "excellent." What is the next criticism Socrates makes of Meno's definition and why is it especially appropriate at this moment? This is followed by a hypothetical argument whose intent is once more to distinguish in Meno's mind the difference between excellent qualities and excellence itself which at 73e2 Meno still has not qrasped. What does this argument have to do with the last criticism?
From 74b3-75bl Socrates tries to do with shaped surfaces what he had failed to do with bees--get Meno to see the one behind the many. Note that these are the shaped surfaces of natural things which reflect light with which we are all familiar--not the "surfaces" of geometric solids which do not to which Socrates is referring in 75el--76a8.(Note how obtuse Meno's question about color is there--geometrical shapes have none.) There are, in short, two argumentative examples or attempts to overcome the same lack of understanding on Meno's part in this section as there were in the last, as Socrates notes at 76e5. Be ready once again to think about the appropriateness of these arguments to the overriding question at hand and the kinds of knowledge of the kinds of evidence they demand. Be prepared also to compare Meno's behavior in this section with the behavior of his slave.

After Meno refuses to make the effort of inquiry, Socrates gives in and gives a definition of "shape" saying that he would be satisfied if Meno would give a similar definition of virtue. Meno refuses and merely insults Socrates" definition as "naive." Judge his reason for saying so and attempt to give that "similar definition" yourself. Note Socrates speech on the good manners of rational discussion at 75d.

After Meno's obtuse question on color, Socrates gives an answer "a la Gorgias. " Do you think he means it?(See 76e23). Why does he give it?

Meno must now keep the promise he made at 75bl. He gives another definition which starts another section. What is its relation to the one that started this section?

Before continuing, consider the assertion "Everyone is virtuous." How would you support it? Try also to define unhappiness on your own.

77b7-8 Socrates seizes on one term in Meno's new definition of virtue and translates it (even in your translation--in the Greek it is from to kala to agatha) into another term--or is it just a change of wording without a change in terms? Record and reflect upon the difference. Note also how different a definition this is from Meno's last. Are the same or different assumptions implied--or both? What are they?
77cl-dl Socrates is here clearly trying to get Meno to agree that only the good is desirable. Meno resists the attempt. Would you agree with him. Is there a possible equivocation on the term? Reflect on the evils of equivocation. At 77dl-8 Meno caves in. What kind of argument causes it? Would it convince you? To answer these questions try filling in the blanks on the following and see if you agree with it. "The perhaps merely illusory things have on us is not a sufficient reason to conclude that these things are either or . Could not things make us and, conversely, could not things make us ?"


77d9-78b2 Socrates divides some persons into two classes and summarily, with Meno's agreement, dismisses the first. Why do these present no problem for his argument, i.e. what is its conclusion and why does this class serve as a support for it? Of the second class, those who desire evil and know it to be so, do you think that the "desiring" of the evil and the "wanting"to be happy or unhappy are equivalent terms? If not, why not and what does this do to Socrates' conclusion? All this has been to establish the necessity of what quality with respect to virtue? How does it do so? Recall the definition Socrates implied as desirable at 75bl4-15.
78b3-79a2 There were two clauses or criteria in Meno's definition of virtue and Socrates has just eliminated one. Which is it? Before proceeding, think about how you would eliminate the next one--if you would. At 78dl-5 Socrates substitutes another term for the main term in the remaining clause. What is it? Note Socrates' sarcasm here. What is implied? If Plato had wanted to demonstrate a cheap anachronistic victory by Socrates over a Thessalian(and this one in particular)in front of an Athenian audience, what conclusion could he have demonstrated, at this point, that Meno had essentially endorsed? Plato's audience is surely filling it in. Note, however, how Socrates continues and how that conclusion is implied. Do you agree with the conclusion at the end of this section and with the reasoning behind it? If you know the answer to this question, you must know your reasons. What are they?

Consider the force of the question at 79c4-6. What separation is implied here, what paradigm being introduced or rejected? How does it condition the question at 79c8-9?
Socrates introduces Meno's own criterion at 79dl-4. Where had Meno introduced it? Compare its appropriateness in the two uses. Note it occurs in Meno's rejection of the only paradigm Socrates seems to endorse. Socrates accommodates Meno's objection with another paradigm which he disclaims-- a geometrical or, properly, analytical(still a paradigm of mathematical reasoning) one which proceeds from the definition of simpler to more complex concepts. Is this appropriate to explain the one behind the many? Is the demand that there be a one behind the many excessive? Is Meno's implied threat at 8Ob5-8 justified (consider what you know of Socrates' fate)? Note also that, though there is an exchange of names, Socrates forswears an exchange of mocking images at 8Oc6-8. Why? If we abandon the demand to see the one behind the many, what are the consequences for the terms of our discussion? How do they differ, if at all, from the ones Meno suggests at D6-11? Which position, Meno's here or Socrates' later is more likely to instill numbness and torpor? Note how images induce to opposite conclusions from arguments here. How does the long argument of the immortality and transmigration of the human soul answer this argument? Consider d7-10-what kind of argument is this? Do you find it persuasive? Does Meno's question address it? Can you describe the divergence in motives between Socrates and Meno that starts at 8Oa8 and proceeds to 8le3-5. Can you describe the contradiction at the latter? What theme is Meno ignoring that Socrates' quote from Pindar reintroduces?

Consider the argument at Dl-6. Just consider it. How does it support the repeatedly insisted upon criterion of Socrates in the whole argument?

Compare Meno's attitude at 82a3-5 with his attitude at the beginning. And what does "speaking from habit" have to do with the discussion so far (what are its implications about appropriate speech here) and as it progresses.

Be ready to read the ensuing episode with the slave boy on at least three levels. How would you describe them?

At what points does Socrates interrupt the slave boy's lesson to speak to Meno? What are the significant points made by these interruptions?

(85bl3-14) What could be meant by the boy's opinions? Which ones? Were they yours (and were your judgements or Meno's about the correctness of those opinions yours or his?) "True opinion" (alethai doxais) also connotes "unforgettable opinion" in Greek. Do you think the slave boy will "remember" these opinions? (85c1-9) The true opinion which took over from "the boy's opinion" becomes (at 85dl) "knowledge." Note the regression back to opinion at 86a7.

If the boy is only recollecting something he had learned at a previous time, how had he learned it? If all knowledge is memory, what does that imply about when learning happens or about whether knowledge is learned? How do your answers to these questions affect the doctrine of the immortality of the scul? Look at the specific conclusions at 86b1-5.

(86b6-13) Socrates disclaimer brings us back to what point in the dialogue? What progress has been made on what topic? What has the dialogue shown us by the time Meno's answer(86c8-22) brings us back, seemingly, to the beginning? What ironies can you discern in Socrates'speech at 86d3-87c2?


What do you think about Socrates condition at 87d5-10? How does it govern the concluding discussion?
THESIS PROMPTS ON THE MENO

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